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TEACHING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
NEW TRICKS: UPDATING THE LAW OF
JOINT INVENTORSHIP IN PATENTS
"If a man write a better book preach a better sermon, or
make a better mousetrap than his neighbor, though he build
his house in the woods, the world will make a beaten path
to his door. ,'
In February 1998, Judge Pauline Newman of the Federal Circuit
filed a dissenting opinion in Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical
Corp.2 and identified an anomaly in the patent law brought upon by
the 1984 amendments to the Patent Act.3 By doing so, she invited
discussion of the law ofjoint inventorship4 and its relation to the law
of joint ownership5 in patents. One of the 1984 amendments to the
law of joint inventorship allows the inclusion of all participating in-
ventors on a patent, without regard to the contribution of each.6 This
amendment raises concerns of equity in joint ownership of the patent
amongst joint inventors who did not contribute equally to the inven-
tion.7 Prior to 1984, co-inventors must have worked together on
virtually every aspect of the invention to be named as joint
1. Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), quoted in J.T. Eaton & Co., Inc. v.
Atlantic Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1572, n.* (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rader,
C.J., dissenting). What result, when the "man" and the "neighbor" make a
better mousetrap together? Will the world make a beaten path to both of their
doors? Will they-should they-both reap the rewards of the mousetrap?
These are the questions raised by the world ofjoint inventorship in patents.
2. 135 F.3d 1456, 1468-72 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., dissenting).
3. See id. at 1471 (Newman, J., dissenting). The Patent Act is codified in
Title 35 of the United States Code.
4. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994).
5. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1471 (Newman, J., dissenting).
6. See 35 U.S.C. § 116.
7. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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inventors on the patent. Otherwise courts would require such in-
ventors to apply for separate patents.
9
It is now apparent that judges transpose pre-1984 concepts of
joint ownership into the new post-1984 inventorship law'q-a judi-
cial act, which the amended law did not specifically address.' When
she dissented, Judge Newman indicated that there were no scholarly
articles on the amended 35 U.S.C. § 116, which covers joint inven-
torship.12 Nearly fifteen years after the amendments and a year after
Ethicon was decided, this anomaly remains unaddressed by the
courts and in need of discussion. This Comment begins that discus-
sion by exploring what will undoubtedly be a further litigated and ju-
ristic subject in the Federal Circuit.
13
I. INTRODUCTION
There are numerous companies, associations, and services in the
business of helping small-time inventors in patenting their inven-
tions.14 Many, if not most, of these organizations are legitimate and
often make a profit by becoming a co-inventor15 with the person
seeking the patent.' 6 There is nothing wrong with this proposition as
long as the original inventor is aware of the ramifications of chang-
ing their status from inventor to co-inventor.
One such organization, AAA InventionMakersTm, provides an
example of such a service. 17 InventionMakers Tm suggests on their
8. See infra Part III (discussing the law of joint inventorship prior to the
1984 amendments).
9. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
10. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1471 (Newman, J., dissenting).
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. The Federal Circuit is the federal court of appeals with exclusive ap-
pellate jurisdiction over patent cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994).
14. For example, a word search for "inventor" on www.yahoo.com, gives a
comprehensive listing of services available to potential patentees. See Yahoo!
Search Results (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://search.yahoo.com/bin/searchp=
inventor>.
15. Where appropriate, the terms joint inventor and co-inventor are used
interchangeably to mean the same inventive entity.
16. See, e.g., AAA InventionMakersTM Partners in US Patents, Engineering,
Manufacturing and Marketing Services (visited Feb. 11, 1999) <http://www.
inventiomnakers.com/> (providing patenting services).
17. See id. [hereinafter InventionMakersa].
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World Wide Web home-page that "Co-Inventing" is their unique
program allowing an inventor to improve the invention while at the
same time providing an advocate to develop the technology.' 8 In-
ventionMakersTM compares their services to those of a patent attor-
ney who charges a rate of $150 to $300 per hour.19 InventionMak-
ersTm does not state, however, that normally a patent attorney does
not become a co-inventor with the original inventor, due to rules of
professional conduct.20 In spite of its silence on this issue, Inven-
tionMakers Tm does provide a valuable service. Without such serv-
ices, many ideas would never come to fruition and be shared with the
public. InventionMakersT has the resources and marketing ability
to patent an invention that the inventor-working alone-lacks.
Moreover, InventionMakersTM offers its services with a money-back
guarantee if the patent is not issued.2 1
InventionMakersTM claims incredibly low costs to the inventor
for manufacturing, marketing and patenting the invention.22 How
then does InventionMakersTM make its money? By taking advantage
of 35 U.S.C. § 262!23 Section 262, entitled "Joint Owners," provides
in its entirety:
18. See AAA InventionMakersTM Partners in US Patents, Engineering,
Manufacturing and Marketing Services (visited Feb. 11, 1999) <http://www.
inventionmakers.com/coinvent.htm>.
19. See id.
20. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(a), (d), (j) &
cmts. (1999). The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct prohibit an attorney from entering into a business transaction with a
client or from acquiring an ownership interest adverse to the client or in the
subject matter of the litigation, unless the terms are fair and reasonable, in
writing, and reasonably understood by the client. See id. at Rule 1.8(a)(1).
Further, the client must be given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel. See id. at Rule 1.8(a)(2)-(3). Admittedly, uninformed
clients can potentially be taken advantage of by attorneys who do not reveal
their ethical duty, a step which InventionMakersT can avoid.
21. See AAA InventionMakersTM Partners in US Patents, Engineering,
Manufacturing and Marketing Services (visited Feb. 11, 1999) <http://www.
inventionmakers.com/Intro.htm>.
22. See id. InventionMakersTm compares its fee of "as little as $7,000" to
manufacture and market a product with what it claims are the more common
costs of over $200,000, to entice the inventor to consider its services. Id. Its
fee for getting a patent, it claims, is $1,995, as compared to $30,000 from a
patent attorney. See id.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (Supp. I 1997).
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In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the
joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell
the patented invention within the United States, or import
the patented invention into the United States, without the
consent of and without accounting to the other owners.
24
By becoming a co-inventor with the original inventor, Inven-
tionMakersT has the legal title, as used in the Patent Act, of a "Joint
Inventor."25 Under the current application of joint ownership princi-
ples, InventionMakersM, as a joint inventor, can become a joint
owner, unless it enters into an agreement to the contrary.26 Inven-
tionMakersT then relies upon § 262 to exploit the patent and reap
the rewards of the original inventor.2 7 The situation is not unlike the
employee-employer context where employees license their rights to
any patented invention they may conceive to their employers. 21 Sec-
tion 262, therefore, allows nventionMakersM to take full advantage
of the patent, including licensing it to others without the consent and
somewhat to the detriment, of the original inventor.29 Of course the
24. Id.
25. See 35 U.S.C. § 116.
26. In actuality, the Patent Act does not automatically equate a joint inven-
tor with a joint owner. Although an inventor has ownership rights in the in-
vention, the inventor can alienate the rights to the patent and cease being a
joint owner. See infra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing alienation of
ownership rights in the employee-employer context).
27. Indeed, in its company mission, InventionMakersTM states that it profits
from "product sales[,] provid[ing] the capital to expand." AAA InventionMak-
ersTM Partners in US Patents, Engineering, Manufacturing and Marketing
Services (visited Feb. 11, 1999) <http://www.inventionmakers.com/Intro.htm>.
28. The employee discovers or invents a new and useful invention, and is
named on the patent, but then the employee assigns the ownership rights in the
patent to the employer, who then exploits the patent with minimal remunera-
tion to the employee. See James C. Pistorino, Recent Developments in Patent
Law, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 355, 362 (1998). In all practicality, employers
often ask the employee to sign a release of interest in the patent at the time
employment commences, even if the employee has not yet conceived of an in-
vention. See id. See, e.g., W. Fritz Fasse, The Muddy Metaphysics of Joint In-
ventorship: Cleaning Up After the 1984 Amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 116, 5
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 156 (1992) (discussing patents in an employment
context).
29. Allowing InventionMakersT to take full advantage of the patent is to
the detriment of the original inventor because, potentially, all income from the
patent could be retained by the original inventor but for the joint inventorship
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original inventor also has this right, and may do the same without the
consent of InventionMakersTM. Patent co-owners are thus "at the
mercy of each other."
30
The concern posed by Judge Newman, therefore, is the alloca-
tion of an undivided interest in the joint ownership rights amongst
each of the joint inventors when the contribution of each inventor is
unequal.
31
An overview of the case that brought about this concern is illus-
trative. In Ethicon, the patent of interest related to trocars, tools used
in endoscopic surgery.3 A trocar is used to make small incisions by
applying pressure on the wall of a body cavity.33. A blade within the
trocar makes the necessary puncture.3 The tool is designed so that
after the blade is removed, a sleeve remains in place to accept endo-
scopic instruments, such as small cameras, for performing surgery.
Due to the pressure necessary to puncture the body cavity, however,
a sudden loss of resistance from the puncture could thrust the blade
forward causing injury to internal organs.35
A patent was issued to Doctor InBae Yoon 6 containing fifty-
five claims 37 and claiming a trocar that nearly eliminated the danger
status of InventionMakersTM. See 35 U.S.C. § 262.
30. Willingham v. Lawton, 555 F.2d 1340, 1344 (6th Cir. 1977); see also
Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1468 (Fed. Cir.
1998) ("This freedom to exploit the patent without a duty to account to other
co-owners also allows co-owners to freely license others to exploit the patent
without the consent of other co-owners.") (citing Schering Corp. v. Roussel-
UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341,344 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). These cases demonstrate the
congressional policy within § 262. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1468.
31. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1472 (Newman, J., dissenting).
32. See id. at 1459.
33. See id. A body cavity, for example, can be classified as the abdomen.
See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 1458-59 (United States Patent No. 4,535,773 issued in 1985).
37. See id. The claims section of a patent defines the protected invention.
See John McDermott, Patent Law Fundamentals 10 (1998) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). It is important to
note that only claims may be found invalid and infringed and not the patent it-
self. See id. For example, when a single claim is found to be invalid in a mul-
tiple claim patent, the remaining claims are not necessarily invalidated as well.
See STEPHEN A. BECKER, PATENT APPLICATIONS HANDBOOK § 3.07 (1998
ed.). "If a patent is analogized to real property, the claims correspond to the
boundary of the property described in the deed. Whereas one trespasses on
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of injury.38 The potential for injury could be alleviated in two
ways.39 The trocar could either be equipped with a blunt rod which
would jut ahead of the blade at the moment of puncture preventing
the blade from reaching other organs, or the blade would retract back
into the trocar at the instant of puncture, again preventing it from
reaching any internal organs.40
Yoon thought of a safety device to prevent such accidental in-
jury many years before the patent was issued.4 1 Prior to full em-
bodiment of the invention and issuance of its patent, Yoon asked Mr.
Young Jae Choi, an electrical technician without a college degree, to
work with him for the development of a safety trocar; the two
worked together for eighteen months.42 Although Choi was not paid
for his work, he produced numerous designs during this time and
suggested possible configurations of the new device, including sev-
eral that were ultimately included and granted in the patent claims.
43
After their relationship ended, Yoon applied for the patent naming
himself as the sole inventor, without informing or naming Choi.44
Ultimately, Yoon granted an exclusive license to Ethicon, Inc.45
Later, when Ethicon sued United States Surgical Corporation for in-
fringement of the Yoon Patent, United States Surgical learned of
Choi's involvement and moved to correct inventorship to include
Choi as a joint inventor.46 At the same time, Choi granted a retroac-
tive license to United States Surgical allowing it to practice and mar-
ket the invention. 47 The Federal Circuit, agreeing with the district
court, found that Choi had in fact conceived two of the fifty-five
claims of the Yoon Patent.48 Particularly, Choi had conceived of
real property, one infringes a patent claim." Id.
38. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1458, 1459.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 1459, 1462.
44. See id. at 1459.
45. See id. at 1458.
46. See id. at 1459. Correction of inventors on an issued patent is allowed
under 35 U.S.C. § 256 by a court when notice and hearing are given to all par-
ties concerned. See 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1994).
47. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1459.
48. See id. at 1461-64.
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"'locating the blunt probe in the shaft and allowing it to pass through
an aperture in the blade surface,"' 49 and he had contributed to "the
rod detaining means." 50  Both of these contributions prevent the
blade from causing further injury by projecting a blunt rod ahead of
the blade. 51 In deciding that these contributions by Choi were suffi-
cient, the majority determined that they indeed appeared within the
claims of the patent.52 This rendered Choi a joint inventor.53
The majority in Ethicon dismissed Judge Newman's concern
that a joint inventor in two of the fifty-five claims was not entitled to
joint ownership of the entire patent.54 Instead, the majority stated
that, "in the context of joint inventorship, each co-inventor presump-
tively owns a pro rata undivided interest in the entire patent, no mat-
ter what their respective contributions." 55 Therefore, "[i]n this case,
Yoon must now effectively share with Choi ownership of all the
claims, even those which he invented by himself.
' 56
As Judge Newman stated, this outcome is fundamentally un-
fair.57 Such outcomes lead to the following hypothetical: inventor X
contributes to claims 1, 2, and 3 of a total often claims; the patent is-
sues with all ten claims; later, it is determined that only claims 4
through 10 are "good claims"; inventor X remains a joint owner of
the entire patent although inventor X did not contribute whatsoever
to the "good claims" composing the ultimate invention. This is the
current state of the law governing joint inventorship in patents.
5 8
49. Id. at 1462.
50. Id. at 1463 (the "rod detaining means" developed by Choi refers to the
action of a solenoid, which interposes a blunt rod to block injury from the
blade).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 1462, 1464.
53. See id. at 1465.
54. See id. at 1468 (Newman, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1465 (citations omitted); see also Elizabeth Forminard et al., Joint
Inventors Own Undivided Interest in Entire Patent, 10 J. PROPRIETARY RTS.
16 (1998) (discussing Ethicon); Katherine Kelly, Cases and Recent Develop-
ments: Patents, 7 FED. CIR. B.J. 417, 432-33 (1997) (discussing Ethicon).
56. Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1466.
57. See id. at 1468-72 (Newman, J., dissenting).
58. See DONALD S. CHIsUM, CISUM ON PATENTS § 2.03[3] (1998) [here-
inafter CHISUM]. See, e.g., Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1456 (granting ajoint inventor
who contributed to only two claims, out of a total of fifty-five claims, an equal
and undivided interest in the entire patent); Pannu v. Iolab, 155 F.3d 1344
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District courts grant joint inventors an undivided interest in the entire
patent although each joint inventor has not contributed proportionally
to the invention.
s9
An anomaly therefore exists in the law of joint ownership, cre-
ated by a change in the law of joint inventorship. This Comment
discusses the change in the law and its effect on joint ownership
rights in a patent. Part II reviews the law of joint inventorship as it
stands today, in particular analyzing the idea of conception as the
touchstone of invention and reviewing the policies inherent in joint
inventorship. Part III examines the 1984 amendments that caused
the change in the law. Part IV assesses how the amended law has
impacted joint ownership of patents and suggests fractionating the
patent to cure the problems posed. Part V makes three recommenda-
tions for alleviating the inequity of joint ownership. Finally, Part VI
concludes that only fractionating the patent into its claims produces
the most equitable outcome for joint inventors.
II. JOINT INVENTORSHIP
Part II of the Patent Act contains one of the most important pro-
visions of United States Patent Law-namely 35 U.S.C. § 102.60
Section 102 sets out the "Conditions for patentability; novelty and
loss of right to patent.",61 The common import of this section is
to establish the well-known and often litigated novelty bars
and statutory bars to patentability. 62 Among the intricate language
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (undisputed that unnamed co-inventor contributed to a total
inventive concept when the two co-inventors were engaged in collaborative
enterprise). See also Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466 (Fed. Cir.
1997). The court, stating that "a joint inventor must contribute in some signifi-
cant manner to the conception of the invention[,]" vacated and remanded the
case, because significant disputes regarding the respective contributions of the
alleged co-inventor existed and the sole named inventor did not meet his bur-
den of proving with clear and convincing evidence that the alleged co-
inventor's contributions were qualitatively insignificant. Id. at 1473-74. These
and numerous other cases illustrate that the inventive contribution of a co-
inventor need not be significant-it only must not be insignificant. See id.
59. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1470 (Newman, J., dissenting).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
61. Id.
62. See generally CHIsuM, supra note 58, § 2.02[2]-2.02[5] (discussing
novelty and statutory bars). "The general purpose behind all the bars is to re-
quire inventors to assert with due diligence their right to a patent through the
1280
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establishing the novelty and statutory bars of § 102, a hidden single
line provision states, "[a] person shall be entitled to a patent
unless... he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be
patented[.] ' 63 The word "he" within the above passage refers to the
specific inventive entity named on the patent.64 With this phrase the
law mandates that "thepatent accurately list the correct inventors of
a claimed invention." 5  However, to accurately exclude non-
inventors from the list, one must first determine which inventors are
to be included. Thus, a differing and surprisingly more complicated
role also contemplated by § 102 is the naming of the proper inventor
or inventors of the subject matter of the patent.
66
filing and prosecution of a patent application." Id. § 6.01. For example, 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) bars a patent if the invention was patented or "described in a
printed publication" anywhere in the world or was in "public use or on sale" in
the United States more than one year before the date of the United States pat-
ent application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also CHISUM, supra note 58,
§ 6.01 (explaining the § 102(b) bar). By setting a time limit (one year) within
which one must file for a patent, the resulting bar set by § 102(b), is known as
a statutory bar. Cf 35 U.S.C. § 102(d). See generally CHISUM, supra note 58,
§ 6 (discussing statutory bars). The remaining subsections of § 102 also pose
bars to patentability. Section 102(a) bars a patent from issuing if the invention
"was known or used by others" in the United States, or "patented or described
in a printed publication" anywhere in the world before the applicant's inven-
tion. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Unlike § 102(b), § 102(a) does not impose an artifi-
cial time limit within which one must file a patent application. Instead, it
merely requires the applicant to have invented the invention prior to it being
patented, described in a printed publication, or known or used by others.
Therefore, this type of a bar is known as a novelty bar. See McDermott, supra
note 37, at 192. Cf 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).
64. See Pannu v. Iolab, 155 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also
CHISUM, supra note 58, § 2.03[1] (discussing disputes under § 102(f)).
65. Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1349. Section 102(f) has often been used to chal-
lenge patentability based on an assertion of misjoinder or nonjoinder of the
proper inventors. See Schulze v. Green, 136 F.3d 786, 792 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(third party can challenge patentability under § 102(f) on a misjoinder basis);
Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1562 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (where the sole named inventor in fact co-invented and deceptively
withheld the co-inventorship, § 102(f) barred the applicant since he "did not
himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.") (emphasis added);
but cf McDermott, supra note 37, at 109 (stating that § 102(f) is normally used
in disputes involving derivation, where the question is whether the applicant
stole the invention from someone else).
66. See Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D.
Pa. 1972), aff'd without opinion, 487 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973).
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Generally, the naming of a single inventor does not pose prob-
lems. However, when two or more inventors pursue claims of a pat-
ent, especially when one has contributed less than the other, deter-
mining joint inventorship becomes a critical issue.
67
A. Factors Determining Inventorship
In addition to the § 102 requirement that the correct inventors be
named on the patent, § 282 bestows a presumption of validity upon
an issued patent.68  This presumption of validity extends to the
named inventors on the patent, even if the names were included erro-
neously, or even deceptively.69 An inventor-claimant challenging the
inventorship of a patent has to meet the burden with clear and con-
vincing evidence.70 Additionally, inventorship is a question of law,
which the Federal Circuit reviews without deference to the district
courts, thus mitigating the burden upon the inventor-claimant.71 Two
key requirements for inventorship are: conception of the subject
67. See id. at 1373. The court in Mueller Brass was frustrated with the law
of joint inventorship, announcing, "[t]he exact parameters of what constitutes
joint inventorship are quite difficult to define. It is one of the muddiest con-
cepts in the muddy metaphysics of the patent law." Id. at 1372.
68. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994); see also Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460
("[p]atent issuance creates a presumption that the named inventors are the true
and only inventors."). The Federal Circuit has explained that the presumption
of validity embodied in § 282 is "static, never-changing." Magnivision, Inc. v.
Bonneau Co., 115 F.3d 956, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing American Hoist &
Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
The purpose of the presumption of validity, codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 282, is to contribute stability to the grant of patent rights.... The
presumption operates by placing the burden of proving invalidity on
the person attacking the patent, who must prove invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence. The presumption does not dissolve and the bur-
den of proof does not change during the trial; rather, the evidence pre-
sented by the challenger must be of such quality and weight as to es-
tablish invalidity despite the presumption.
Magnivision, 115 F.3d at 958 (citations omitted).
69. See Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 980
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2459 (1997). Deception is, however,
grounds for inequitable conduct rendering the entire patent invalid. See gener-
ally Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing the requirements of inequitable conduct).
70. See Magnivision, 115 F.3d at 958.
71. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460; Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
1282
JOINT IN VENTORSHIP
matter of the invention, and corroboration of the invention with oth-
ers.72  Likewise, determining whether an alleged inventor partici-
pated in conceiving the subject matter at issue is important in joint
inventorship.73
1. Conception
It has been said that "[c]onception is the touchstone of inventor-
ship, the completion of the mental part of invention." 74 Conception
is the "formation, in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and per-
manent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereaf-
ter to be applied in practice."75 Conception is complete when a per-
son of ordinary skill in the art76 would be able to reduce the
invention to practice without subjecting it to extensive research or
experimentation. 77 At this point, the idea is clearly defined in the in-
ventor's mind.78 Conception, then, is the key element to a determi-
nation of inventorship.
The issue of joint inventors is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 116.79
When joint inventors conceive the invention, it is not necessary that
72. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460-61.
73. See Sewall, 21 F.3d at 415.
74. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
75. WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INvENTIONS § 376 (1890), quoted in Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies,
Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
76. The "person of ordinary skill in the art," a term of patent law, has been
defined by the Federal Circuit to be one "presumed to . . . thinko along the
line[s] of conventional wisdom in the art... not one who undertakes to inno-
vate, whether by patient, and often expensive, systematic research or by ex-
traordinary insights." Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d
448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
77. See Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1228; see also Sewall, 21 F.3d at
415 (stating that "[c]onception is complete when one of ordinary skill ...
could construct the apparatus without unduly extensive research or experi-
mentation."); Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating
that conception must include every feature of the claimed invention).
78. See Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1228. The second requirement of
invention, corroborating evidence, may be shown, for example, by contempo-
raneous disclosure. See id. See also, infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the corrobo-
ration requirement).
79. See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994); Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d
1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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each inventor "'make the same type or amount of contribution' to the
invention." 80  Indeed, section 116 of the Patent Act specifically
authorizes the contrary. 1
Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though (1)
they did not physically work together or at the same time,
(2) each did not make the same type or amount of contribu-
tion, or (3) each did not make a contribution to the subject
matter of every claim of the patent.
82
There is no "lower limit on the quantum or quality of inventive
contribution required for a person to qualify as a joint inventor [set
by section 116]. Rather, a joint invention is simply the product of a
collaboration between two or more persons working together to solve
the problem addressed. ' 3 As § 116 suggests, a joint inventor does
not have to make a contribution to every claim within a patent.8 4 All
that is required is that a contribution be made to one claim.85
Of course, the specific facts of each case will ultimately deter-
mine whether a person is a joint inventor.86 This suggests that there
is no bright-line test.87 However, each joint inventor must at least
contribute significantly to the conception of the invention. 88 Merely
reducing the idea to practice does not necessarily render that person a
joint inventor.89 Furthermore, inventors "dof not lose [their] status
as joint inventors just because [they] used the services, ideas, and aid
of others in the process of perfecting [their] invention[s] ,"90 Neither
80. Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 116).
81. See id.
82. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994).
83. Fina Oil, 123 F.3d at 1473 (citing Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at
1227).
84. See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994).
85. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460.
86. See Fina Oil, 123 F.3d at 1473.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460 (citing Sewall, 21 F.3d at 416).
90. Fina Oil, 123 F.3d at 1473. "An inventor 'may use the services, ideas,
and aid of others in the process of perfecting his invention without losing his
right to a patent."' Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758
F.2d 613, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting Hobbs v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 451 F.2d 849, 864 (5th Cir. 1971)). "The law has long been settled:
He is the inventor and is entitled to the patent who first brought the machine to
perfection and made it capable of useful operation." Hobbs, 451 F.2d at 864.
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does the mere exercise of normal skill expected of one skilled in the
art make a joint inventor;91 there must be an inventive act.92
Thus, if one simply explains to the inventors concepts which are
well known and in the current state of the art, they will not become
joint inventors. 93 This is best illustrated in Hess v. Advanced Car-
diovascular Systems, Inc.94 Two doctors, unsuccessful in their ef-
forts to develop the balloon of a balloon angioplasty catheter,95 ap-
proached Mr. Hess, an engineer, for assistance. 96 Hess suggested
that the doctors try a material that his company produced.97 He de-
scribed to them how the material could be used.98 Hess stated that
the principles, which he taught the two doctors in the use of the ma-
terial, were available in published textbooks and generally known to
those skilled in the art?9 The doctors, using concepts that Hess ex-
plained to them, went on to develop their invention and ultimately
obtained a patent.100 Subsequently, Hess heard of the patent and de-
clared that he was a joint inventor of the catheter.101 Relying upon
Shatterproof Glass ,102 the court held that Hess's suggestions did not
rise to the level of conception, and therefore did not make him a co-
inventor.'0 3 According to the court, Hess did no more than "a skilled
91. See Fina Oil, 123 F.3d at 1473; Sewall, 21 F.3d at 416.
92. See Fina Oil, 123 F.3d at 1473.
93. See, e.g., Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976,
981 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2459 (1997) (advancing the proposition
that a company salesperson does not become a co-inventor by merely selling
the company's products to inventors).
94. 106 F.3d 976 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2459 (1997).
95. A balloon angioplasty catheter is used in cardiology to reduce artery
blockage. See id. at 977.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 978. Although the doctors used material that Hess provided,
they did not use the techniques that Hess suggested. See id.
101. See id. As in Ethicon, the issue of joint inventorship arose when the
patentee's assignee sued for infringement of its patent. See id. As a defense,
the defendant asserted invalidity of the patent for failure to join Hess as the
proper inventor. See id.
102. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
103. See Hess, 106 F.3d at 981.
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salesman would do in explaining how his employer's product could
be used to meet a customer's 
requirements."'p
Therefore, unless there is an inventive act amounting to concep-
tion, mere suggestions by a would-be patentee do not amount to joint
inventorship. 105 This proposition was first posited by the United
States Supreme Court in 1853 in the landmark case of O'Reilly v.
Morse.1°6 In a seventy-five-page opinion by Chief Justice Taney, the
Court held that Samuel Morse's patent for the telegraph was not ren-
dered invalid by Morse's reliance upon information he obtained from
others. 0 7 The Court stated:
Neither can the inquiries he made, or the information or ad-
vice he received, from men of science in the course of his
researches, impair his right to the character of an inventor.
No invention can possibly be made, consisting of a combi-
nation of different elements of power, without a thorough
knowledge of the properties of each of them, and the mode
in which they operate on each other. And it can make no
difference, in this respect, whether he derives his informa-
tion from books, or from conversation with men skilled in
the science. If it were otherwise, no patent, in which a
combination of different elements is used, could ever be
obtained. For no man ever made such an invention without
having first obtained this information, unless it was discov-
ered by some fortunate accident. And it is evident that such
an invention as the Electro-Magnetic Telegraph could never
have been brought into action without it. For a very high
degree of scientific knowledge and the nicest skill in the
mechanic arts are combined in it, and were both necessary
to bring it into successful operation. And the fact that
Morse sought and obtained the necessary information and
counsel from the best sources, and acted upon it, neither
impairs his rights as an inventor, nor detracts from his mer-
its.1
08
104. Id.
105. See also infra Part II.A.2.
106. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
107. Seeid. atlll.
108. Id.
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Although the rule announced in Morse remains the law of the
land today, it is not absolute. 10 9 The co-inventorship status of third
parties is to be determined based on the facts of each case.110 There-
fore, the critical question to be asked in joint inventorship cases is
whether there is joint conception."' Joint conception, on the other
hand, must be determined by analyzing "who conceived, as that term
is used in the patent law, the subject matter of the claims at issue."
112
2. Corroboration
Proving the required conception is quite a different matter from
proving the required corroboration. Corroborating evidence of the
invention is necessary to prevent inventorship determinations from
turning solely on a credibility contest between co-inventors.
113
109. See Gary A. Clark & Jeanine L. Hayes, Recent Decision Reminds of the
Need for Care in Using Third Parties to Assist in Invention Development
(1997) (visited Feb. 11, 1999) <http://www.smrh.com/articles/Clark.htm>.
110. See id.; see also supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the
conception requirement based on specific facts). Although the principles an-
nounced in Morse have been firmly grounded in the law for nearly 150 years,
cases such as Hess and Ethicon make it clear that potential patentees should be
careful with whom they work. In determining whether the contribution made
by a third party will render them a co-inventor, the courts also consider various
other factors. For example, the greater the degree of control an original in-
ventor has over the design, testing, and experimenting of the invention, the less
likely a court will find that the third party was a co-inventor. See Clark &
Hayes, supra note 109. The Hess court implied that when an inventor seeks
advice from others, the inventor may prevent a future claim of co-inventorship
by a third party if the inventor alone conducts much of the research or testing.
See id.; see also Hess, 106 F.3d at 981 (discussing co-inventorship status).
Furthermore, the original inventor would be wise to give specific direction for
any hired assistants to follow. See Clark & Hayes, supra note 109. Better yet,
the original inventor should actively participate in every part of the develop-
ment and testing of the invention, where possible. See id. Other possibilities
include obtaining agreements in advance, maintaining invention notebooks,
and documenting communications. See id. As a last resort the original inven-
tor may tailor the patent application to claim only the embodiments that the
original inventor conceived independently. See id. Narrowly circumscribed
claims, however, generally limit the scope of the patent to the exclusion of po-
tential inventor-claimants. See id. See also, BECKER, supra note 37, §§ 2.02-
2.04 (discussing various methods of claim drafting).
111. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 1464.
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Because inventorship is a mental act, the inventor must offer cor-
roborating evidence to show that the "inventor disclosed to others his
'completed thought expressed in such clear terms as to enable those
skilled in the art' to make the invention." 114 The standard of proof
required to show corroboration is that of clear and convincing evi-
dence, and although corroboration can be in any form, an inventor's
testimony on its own is insufficient to meet this standard. 115 Once
the inventor presents corroborating evidence, it is assessed under a
"rule of reason" analysis. 116 The complete evidence is evaluated "so
that a sound determination of the credibility of the inventor's story
may be reached."
'"17
Once an alleged inventor has shown conception and corrobora-
tion, he is on his way to being named on the patent as a joint inven-
tor.
1 8
114. Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citation omit-
ted).
115. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1461 (quoting Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187,
1194 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("[A]n inventor's testimony respecting the facts sur-
rounding a claim of derivation or priority of invention cannot, standing alone,
rise to the level of clear and convincing proof.")). The various forms of cor-
roborating evidence include documents, circumstantial evidence and oral tes-
timony. Precedent suggests that contemporaneous documents that the alleged
inventor prepared can corroborate his testimony. See Price, 988 F.2d at 1195-
96. Furthermore, enough circumstantial evidence, especially if it is from an
independent source, may also suffice for corroboration. See Knorr v. Pearson,
671 F.2d 1368, 1373 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citation omitted). For example, circum-
stantial factors tending to show corroboration include: (1) the need for assis-
tance by one of the co-inventors; (2) the backgrounds of the co-inventors; (3)
the nature of the relationship between the co-inventors; (4) the length of time
the co-inventors worked together; and (5) any payment made for services by
one co-inventor to the other. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1464.
116. Price, 988 F.2d at 1195.
117. Id. (citation omitted).
118. The Patent Act also allows correction of misjoinder and nonjoinder. As
the terms themselves suggest, misjoinder is the inappropriate naming as an in-
ventor on a patent or patent application of one who did not contribute to the
conception of the invention. Nonjoinder, on the other hand, is the failure to
name a true inventor on the patent or application who did contribute to the
conception of the invention. See generally Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc.,
119 F.3d 1551, 1554-55 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (allowing correction in all misjoinder
cases featuring an error and in nonjoinder cases where the unnamed inventor is
free of deceptive intent). When a patent has not yet issued, correction of in-
ventors on the application is accomplished through § 116. After the patent is-
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B. Policy Considerations Behind Joint Inventorship
The United States Constitution empowers Congress "to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discover-
ies." 119  The Constitution speaks of "Inventors," not applicants.
Hence, one of the fundamental principles of United States patent law
is to award patents to those who are first to invent, rather than those
who are first to file. 120 This same policy underlies issues of joint in-
ventorship. 121 However, in the context of joint inventorship, inven-
tors must "travel a common path" toward a "common destination"
before the patent law will grant them a patent jointly.12 2 Thus,
granting a patent to the first to invent forces joint inventors to col-
laborate on the invention. 123 Two inventors working completely in-
dependently and arriving at the same invention at the same time will
not be allowed to join as joint inventors.
124
Two important policy factors emerge. First, because patent law
requires that an "actual" inventor be named on a patent, only an ac-
tual inventor has any natural right in his creations. 125 A natural right
in an invention has been characterized as a right brought upon by the
inventor's own "sweat of [the] brow."' 2 6  Second, public benefit
from a patented invention is very important.'27 "[W]ithout techno-
logical and scientific developments, we could not maintain our
current standard of living or hope for the diminution of unemploy-
ment caused by foreign competition.' 28 It is apparent that the "prin-
cipal interest of the United States [in] granting [a] monopoly 129 [to
sues, one must rely on § 256. See id. at 1553.
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
120. See W. Fritz Fasse, The Muddy Metaphysics of Joint Inventorship:
Cleaning up after the 1984 Amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 116, 5 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 153, 154-55 (1992); see also CHISUM, supra note 58, § 10.01.
121. See Fasse, supra note 120, at 154-55.
122. Id. at 159.
123. See id.; see also supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text (discussing
the requirements of conception by joint inventors).
124. See Fasse, supra note 120, at 159.
125. See id. at 155 (discussing natural rights in an invention).
126. Id. at 155 n.13.
127. See id. at 155-56.
128. 130 CONG. REC. 28,069 (1984) (statements of Rep. Kastenmeier).
129. Although our system of government does not support monopolies, the
grant of a patent has been characterized as a monopoly, granted to inventors,
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inventors is the] benefit[] derived by the public from the work of
creators."'130 It is, therefore, imperative to grant patent rights not to
the one who brings the invention to the public, but to the one who
brings the invention to the public first-and that is the first actual in-
ventor.131 The public does not gain any benefit from an inventor
who derives 132 the invention from a prior inventor and outruns the
latter to the patent office. 133 It follows that joint inventors must have
an "inventive nature of contribution";1 34 they must have some rela-
tion toward each other and to the conception of the invention.1
35
Special problems arise in the context of joint inventors, espe-
cially when team research, sponsored by an employer yields a patent
with numerous joint inventors. 136 The employer has an incentive to
name many inventors on the patent in order to spread recognition and
reward the numerous people who worked on the invention. 131 On the
other hand, the true inventors may feel short-changed if others who
are team members but not contributors to the invention are named on
the patent. 138 Inventors are often proud of their accomplishments
leading to their inventions. Naming numerous inventors dilutes the
inventive contribution of each individual inventor. 139 Thus, the pol-
icy behind joint inventorship supports the employee who invents by
for a limited time, in exchange for their efforts in bringing new technology to
the public. See CIsUM, supra note 58, § 2.01. See also, A. F. Stoddard &
Co., Ltd. v. Dann, (D.C. Cir. 1977) (describing the monopolistic nature of a
patent as "the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, using, and vend-
ing to others .... ).
130. 130 CONG. REc. 28,069 (1984) (statements of Rep. Kastenmeier).
131. See Fasse, supra note 120, at 156.
132. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f). Derivation is the misappropriation or copying
of an invention from the actual first inventor. See, e.g., Fasse, supra note 120
at 156.
133. See Fasse, supra note 120, at 156.
134. See id.
135. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the conception requirement of joint
inventorship).
136. See, e.g., Fasse, supra note 120, at 156-57.
137. See id. at 157. The employer may also want to deliberately misidentify
inventors to prevent prior in-house inventions from becoming prior art to the
current invention. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
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granting the patent only to the contributors who were actually in-
volved in "legal invention."
140
A further interesting problem arises when employees with dif-
fering employers collaborate on an invention. 14 1 The incentives of
the employees remain the same. The employers, however, would
like to name only their respective participating employees and leave
out the employees of the collaborating employer. 142 Policy dictates
that only the true inventors are entitled to the patent.
43
Since new technology enhances our lives, a common aim of the
policies behind joint inventorship is to promote the greatest number
of patentable inventions.144 To increase patentable inventions, these
policies should further encourage collaboration between joint inven-
tors.145 In turn, this will increase the number of joint endeavors
yielding an increasing number of patentable inventions.
146
III. THE 1984 AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 116
Prior to the 1984 statutory change to § 116, a person who had
not jointly coflceived and contributed to the entire invention could
not be named a joint inventor. Similarly, a person who contributed
only to some claims but not others was not a joint inventor. 147 There
had to be a "simultaneous production of the genius and labor of both
parties.' 148 Therefore in Ethicon, Choi could not have been made a
joint inventor prior to 1984.149 As the Morse case supports, "[tihose
assistants who worked on an invention at the behest of the originator
of the idea did not achieve the legal status of 'joint inventor."
' 50
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 158.
144. See id. at 159.
145. See id. at 159-60.
146. See id. at 160.
147. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting).
148. Steams v. Barrett, 22 F. Cas. 1175, 1181 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No.
13,337).
149. See supra Part I.
150. Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also O'Reilly
v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 110-12 (1853) (discussing the challengers'
claims and Morse's discourse with others).
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Therefore, assistants could not be joint owners since they were not
joint inventors and as such had no interest in the patent. 151
By amending § 116, Congress authorized naming as an inventor
any person who assisted in the development of an invention.152 This,
however, does not mean that Congress "intended to discard the fun-
damental requirement tht [sic] there be some form of collaboration
between the joint inventors."' 153 Although § 116 does not require that
joint inventors physically work together, collaboration is neverthe-
less possible when joint inventors work separately.'1 4 In fact, Con-
gress "envisioned [some] level of collaboration including at least
some communication among joint inventors" to support productive
research.155
We must read amended § 116 as imposing negative guide-
lines.'5 6 There are three specific negative guidelines that the new
section established. First, joint inventors do not "physically [have to]
work together or at the same time."'157 Second, they do not have to
"make the same type or amount of contribution ....58 And, fi-
nally, several inventors may be joint inventors even though each "did
not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim."' 5 9 Be-
cause these guidelines are negative in nature, they "address only
what is not required forjoint invention."'160 Established case law fills
in the rest. For example, inventors must still meet the requirements
of conception and corroboration. 161
151. See Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583, 602-04 (1868).
"[O]ne less than a true joint inventor was forbidden from 'appropriat[ing] to
himself the entire result of the ingenuity and toil of the originator, or put[ing]
[sic] it in the power of any subsequent infringer to defeat the patent."'
Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quotingAgawam, 74 U.S.
at 604) (alterations in original).
152. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting).
153. Fasse, supra note 28, at 166 (quoting DONALD J. CHISUM, PATENTS,
§ 2.02[2] (Supp. 1990)).
154. See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994).
155. Fasse, supra note 120, at 180.
156. See id. at 165-66.
157. 35 U.S.C. § 116.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. Fasse, supra note 120, at 166.
161. See supra notes 66-116 and accompanying text.
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The principal reason for amending § 116 was to accommodate
the growing number of patents filed by team research organizations,
such as large corporations employing hundreds of "co-inventors."
162
Since the previous law required simultaneous conception and contri-
bution by each named inventor on each claim, it was becoming in-
creasingly impossible for team research entities to file for patents,
without "producing pitfalls for patentees."'16 3 The requirement that
all co-inventors contribute to every claim was known as the "all
claims rule."'164 The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks testi-
fied in front of the House Subcommittee Hearings on Innovation and
Patent Law Reform, stating that, "[c]omplying with [the] require-
ment[s of the all claims rule] is sometimes difficult and at times im-
possible."'165 Thus, to increase innovation, improve the "economic
health" of the Nation and create more jobs, the amendment recog-
nized the "realities of modem team research" by relaxing the re-
quirements of joint inventorship and allowing more patents to be
filed by joint inventors.1
66
Prior to the amendment of § 116, serious legal problems arose
when multiple inventors contributed to an invention but did not con-
tribute to every claim. 167 One tool co-inventors could use to bypass
the all claims rule was to file for separate patent applications on the
separate claims that each inventor worked on.168 This procedure
however, would be complex, expensive, and often confusing.
169
Gradually, the advance of technology and the advent of team re-
search added to the frustrations of joint inventorship, leading to nu-
merous invalidated patents because all of the named inventors did
162. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. See Fasse, supra note 120, at 178.
165. Id.
166. See 130 CONG. REc. 28,069-71, 28,074 (1984) (statement of Rep. Kas-
tenmeier).
167. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting).
168. See CISUM, supra note 58, § 2.03[3]; Fasse, supra note 28, at 178
n.146; Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting). See also Worden
v. Fisher, 11 F. 505, 509 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1882) (stating that when distinct
parts of a machine are invented by two different persons, they should each take
out separate patents).
169. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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not contribute to each and every claim. 7 ° The amendment identified
these "pitfalls" and removed them. 171
IV. JOINT OWNERSHIP
A. The Effect ofAmended Section 116 on Joint Ownership
Although the amendment to § 116 alleviated many of the con-
cerns involving joint inventorship, it did not specifically address the
issue of joint ownership. 7 2 Nowhere within the text of § 116, as
amended, are the words "joint ownership," nor is there a reference to
ownership. Why, then, have the courts repeatedly applied pre-1984
ownership concepts to post-1984 inventorship cases? The courts do
acknowledge that concepts of joint ownership are distinct from joint
inventorship. 173 In 1993, the Federal Circuit stated in Beech Aircraft
v. EDO Corp.:
It is elementary that inventorship and ownership are sepa-
rate issues .... [I]nventorship is a question of who actually
invented the subject matter claimed in a patent. Ownership,
however, is a question of who owns legal title to the subject
170. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman listed ten cases based
on this antiquated rule. See id. at 1469-70 (Newman, J., dissenting). For ex-
ample, in Jamesbury Corp. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1384, 1395 (Ct. Cl.
1975), the inclusion of more or fewer than the true number of inventors ren-
dered the patent invalid. In Amax Fly Ash Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d
1041, 1050 (Ct. Cl. 1975), the court stated that "[w]here more or less than the
true inventors are named, the patent is void." Additionally, in Hobbs v. United
States, Atomic Energy Comm'n, 451 F.2d 849, 866 (5th Cir. 1971), the patent
on ajoint invention was held invalid for failure to list all inventors. Numerous
other cases support these propositions. See Iowa State Univ. Research Found.,
Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 444 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1971); Pointer v. Six Wheel
Corp., 177 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1949); Shreckhise v. Ritchie, 160 F.2d 593 (4th
Cir. 1947); Thropp & Sons Co. v. De Laski & Thropp Circular Woven Tire
Co., 226 F. 941 (3d Cir. 1915); Rival Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Prods. Co., 358 F.
Supp. 91 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Stewart v. Tenk, 32 F. 665 (C.C.S.D. Ill. 1887).
171. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1470 (Newman, J., dissenting).
172. See id. at 1469-71 (Newman, J., dissenting).
173. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
1993); Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 417 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Ethicon, 135 F.3d
at 1465.
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matter claimed in a patent, patents have the attributes of
personal property.
174
Furthermore, the court went on to say that the person, "who ul-
timately possesses ownership rights in that subject matter has no
bearing whatsoever on the question of who actually invented that
subject matter.' 75 Realizing these fundamental principles of owner-
ship in patents, courts nevertheless allow a joint inventor to have full
ownership in an entire patent even if the joint inventor has not con-
tributed to each and every claim.
176
The Ethicon court's acquiescence in these principles neverthe-
less led it to state that "'an invention presumptively belongs to its
creator. ' ,"177 What the majority failed to realize is that there is no one
creator of an invention in a joint inventorship case. This is especially
true when one of the co-inventors has contributed only a minutiae,
just enough to meet the conception requirement of invention. In-
stead, the court simply stated that "[i]ndeed, in the context of joint
inventorship, each co-inventor presumptively owns a pro rata undi-
vided interest in the entire patent, no matter what their respective
contributions."
78
To bolster this holding, the majority explained its reasoning by
claiming that § 116 does not require joint inventors to contribute to
every claim. 1 9  The majority then stated that when Congress
amended § 116, it did not amend the statute covering ownership,
which continues to state "'patents shall have the attributes of per-
sonal property." ' 180 The majority followed this reasoning to posit the
notion that property rights must attach to patents as a whole and not
to individual claims.' 8' Further, the majority suggested that
174. BeechAircraft, 990 F.2d at 1248.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1465 (stating that "each co-inventor pre-
sumptively owns a pro rata undivided interest in the entire patent, no matter
what their respective contributions").
177. Id. (quoting Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 406
(Fed. Cir. 1996)).
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. Id. at 1465-66 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 261). The provisions discussing
ownership of patents are covered by 35 U.S.C. §§ 261-262.
181. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1466.
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because § 262 covering joint owners speaks of "joint owners of a
patent" and not of "joint owners of claims," § 262 must mean that a
joint inventor to one claim is also a joint owner to the entire pat-
ent. 182 The majority seemingly negated the fact that a co-inventor of
only one claim is entitled to ownership of the entire patent, which
has numerous claims, by returning to § 116 and stating that
"[i]nventors may apply for a patent jointly even though... each did
not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim."'
183
This reasoning is skewed and circular. The majority begins by
relying on § 116, stating that more than one inventor may apply for a
patent even though each did not contribute to every claim. 3 4 This
does not, however, automatically endow each joint inventor with full
and common ownership of the entire invention. "That is not a rea-
sonable consequence of the change in the law of naming inventors..
,,15 Furthermore, although the sections regarding ownership give
patents the attributes of personal property and grant joint owners
equal rights in the entirety of the patent, these sections do not define
joint owners. 186 Joint owners are not joint inventors. This is evident
from § 261, which allows assignment of the patent to a "joint owner"
and from § 262, which allows the joint owner to sell the patented in-
vention.8 7 Finally, the majority returns to § 116 to restate that joint
inventors may apply for a patent jointly even if each inventor did not
contribute to every claim. 88 The law allows the naming of joint in-
ventors on a patent, but does not grant rights in the entire patent to
every joint inventor.
8 9
The change in the law merely provides that everyone who con-
tributed to the invention may be named on the patent. This is a rea-
sonable and fair result, as a patent should note the inventors. The
change in the law provides the necessary ability to name as inventors
those who assisted in a minor fashion-those contributing to the
conception of a portion of the patent-but not to each and every
182. See id.
183. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 116).
184. See id. at 1466.
185. Id. at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting).
186. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 261,262 (1994 & Supp. 111994).
187. See id.
188. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1466.
189. See id. at 1471 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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claim. In this way, a patent recognizes contributors who actually
contribute to the "conceptive" effort and who may have been previ-
ously left off the patent because they did not contribute to each and
every claim. 190 This has become true, for example, in the area of
team research. This change removed the hurdles and pitfalls that
faced joint inventors in team research situations. 191 Therefore, own-
ership interests under § 116 are irrelevant to the purpose of the
amendment of § 116. In other words, "[s]ection 116 has nothing to
do with patent ownership."' 92
B. Fractionating the Patent
Prior to the amendment of § 116, joint inventors must have
made a contribution to each and every claim of the patent. In that
context, it was logical that joint inventors were automatically joint
owners. Unless joint inventors assigned their rights away, the issue
of whether one joint inventor was also a joint owner did not arise be-
cause joint ownership was based on the principle of joint inven-
tion.
193
As section 261 of the Act states, "patents... have the attributes
of personal property.' 194 Thus, patent ownership has its roots in the
law of property 195  a state law matter. 196 The courts have generally
relied upon common law concepts of tenancy in common and undi-
vided interests in patent ownership disputes. 197 Tenancy in common
190. See id. at 1470 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman stated that
"[t]he amendment simply permitted persons to be named on the patent docu-
ment, whether as minor contributors to a subordinate embodiment, or full part-
ners in the creation and development of the invention." Id. (Newman, J., dis-
senting).
191. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
192. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
193. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 75, § 396 ("Only where the same sin-
gle, unitary idea of means is the product of two or more minds, working pari
passu, and in communication with each other, is the conception truly joint and
the result a joint invention."). Pari passu, a Latin term, means "[b]y an equal
progress" or "without preference." BLACK's LAW DICTIoNARY 1115 (6th ed.
1990).
194. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
195. See generally Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261
U.S. 24, 40 (1923) (discussing "patent property").
196. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1471 (Newman, J., dissenting).
197. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
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provides that property is held in undivided fractional shares.
198
Therefore, joint inventors fully sharing in the invention are legally
tenants in common, sharing an undivided interest in the patent.
199
Prior to 1984, the time at which § 116 was amended, this was a logi-
cal result. However, with the amended § 116, "the legal premise that
each named person had made a full and equal contribution to the en-
tire patented invention became obsolete."
2°°
Traditionally, property law has treated persons equally when
their respective contributions were not equal.20 ' In fact, property law
suggests an inherent right to compel partition. A co-tenant has this
right, a right that is "almost absolute." 202 The same right should be-
long to joint inventors who feel that their rights to ownership in a
patent are being transgressed by a co-inventor who did not contribute
significantly. Indeed, "[n]o theory of the law of property supports
... a distortion of ownership rights"'203 like the current application of
concepts ofjoint inventorship to joint ownership in patents.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Noteworthy are three possible outcomes: (1) the patent law can
fractionate the patent into its claims, (2) it can grant complete owner-
ship rights in an undivided interest in the entire patent to all joint in-
ventors, or (3) it can grant no rights to the co-inventor whose contri-
bution was ancillary and minor.
20 4
198. Tenancy in common is generally defined as "[a] form of ownership
whereby each tenant [or owner] holds an undivided interest in property."
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1465 (6th ed. 1990). An important aspect of such
ownership, is that the interest in each co-tenant (co-owner) does not terminate
and pass to the surviving tenant (owner) upon the death of one of the co-
tenants (co-owners), instead it passes to the deceased co-tenant's (co-owner's)
heirs. See id.
199. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1471 (Newman, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
201. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1472 n.1 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Hamilton v. Hamilton,
597 A.2d 856, 859-60 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1990)).
203. Id. at 1472 (Newman, J., dissenting).
204. The term "minor" is used here to mean a contribution of a co-inventor,
which is insignificant as compared to the original inventor in a two-inventor
scenario. Where there are more than two inventors, each inventor's contribu-
tion will be compared to that inventor's contribution which is the greatest.
This establishes "a grading" system, not to determine joint inventorship, but to
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A. Fractional Ownership of the Patent
Modem patent law should not treat joint inventors as equals in
determining their ownership rights when their respective contribu-
tions are not equal.2 °5 Instead, the law should discriminate, provid-
ing for the partitioning of interests in the patent according to the
contribution to each claim. Only the patent should be partitioned
into the respective claims to which co-inventors contributed. There
would be no need to fragment the claims themselves; doing so would
prove too cumbersome. Admittedly, inventors may contribute only
to portions of claims, as well. However, a simple calculation of the
number of claims to which co-inventors contributed compared with
the total number of claims in the patent would suffice for determina-
tion of ownership rights. This additional calculation would not bur-
den the courts since courts must determine to which claims an al-
leged co-inventor contributed in order to determine whether or not
the co-inventor should be named as a joint inventor, in the first in-
stance. For example, in Ethicon, Choi should be entitled to two out
of the fifty-five claims, or 3.64% of the entire ownership rights in the
patent. If the patent is successful and yields income, Choi should be
entitled to 3.64% of that income and no more, for he should not
benefit from the fruits of another.
B. Complete Ownership of the Patent
This situation reflects the state of the current law. Once co-
inventors successfully name themselves as joint inventors, they
would have full rights to an undivided interest in the entire patent.
However, this results in an unfair distribution of patent rights among
inventors who did not contribute significantly to the patent.
The modem law in patent ownership is similar to ownership of
joint works in copyrights. Joint authors of a copyrighted worked are
co-owners. 216 The 1976 Copyright Act, however, states that a "joint
work" is a "work prepared by two or more authors with the intention
determine joint ownership.
205. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
206. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994). To become joint owners in a work in
copyright, authors must first create a joint work. Section 201(a) is entitled
"Initial Ownership" and reads in pertinent part, "[t]he authors of a joint work
are co[-]owners of a copyright in the work." Id.
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that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole. 20 7 Thus, the Copyright Act introduces the
element of intent as a mechanism for determining the meaning of
"joint" in "joint authorship. 20 8 Under these principles, each joint
author has certain rights and responsibilities. 20 9 They are each co-
tenants with a one-half undivided interest in the work.210 Each joint
author can grant nonexclusive licenses to third parties or the joint
authors together can grant an exclusive license.2 1 1 And they are each
responsible for an accounting of the profits.2 12 A similar approach
can be adopted in patent law. However, under the Copyright Act, the
authors must intend to create an inseparable work. The intention to
create a unitary work is an indispensable key in copyrights. "The
touchstone... is the intention, at the time the writing is done, that
the parts be absorbed or combined into an integrated unit. 2 13 The
importance of this requirement is to ensure "that true collaborators in
the creative process are accorded the perquisites of co-authorship and
to guard against the risk that a sole author is denied exclusive author-
ship status simply because another person rendered some form of as-
sistance."214 Finally, each of the contributions from putative authors
must be copyrightable on its own. 2 15 In this way, "spurious claims"
207. 17 U.S.C. § 101. "Parts of a unitary whole are 'inseparable' when they
have little or no independent meaning standing alone." Childress v. Taylor,
945 F.2d 500, 505 (2d Cir. 1991). Works that are inseparable may include
written works, for example, plays, the work in dispute in Childress. See id.
"[P]arts of a unitary whole are 'interdependent' when they have some meaning
standing alone but achieve their primary significance because of their com-
bined effect.. . ." Id. These types of works may include the words and music
to a song. See id.
208. See Childress, 945 F.2d at 504-05.
209. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 5.4[C]
& n.55 (2d ed. 1995).
210. See Childress, 945 F.2d at 507.
211. See LEAFFER, supra note 209, at § 5.4[C].
212. See, e.g., Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing
rights and responsibilities of joint authors).
213. Childress, 945 F.2d at 505 (quoting the legislative history in trying to
clarify the meaning of "intent").
214. Id. at 504.
215. See id. at 507. See also Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 201-05 (2d
Cir. 1998) (applying the principles and factors from Childress and finding al-
though alleged co-author made a copyrightable contribution, there was no in-
tent on the part of either author to create a joint work).
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may be avoided by "those who might otherwise try to share the fiuits
of the efforts of a sole author of a copyrightable work, even though a
claim of having contributed copyrightable material could be asserted
by those so inclined. ' 16
No similar construction of the law exists in patent law. Thus,
where inventors intend and agree from the start of a project that their
contributions to any invention be made as a whole, each can be a
joint owner. But this does not change the law of joint inventors-co-
inventors remain named on the patent as joint inventors if each has
contributed to at least one claim of the patent.
C. No Ownership Rights to a Minor217 Contributing Inventor
This situation does not purport to take away the right of a minor
joint inventor to be named on a patent. This option, however, would
require a higher standard of conception from contributing co-
inventors such that their respective contributions would not be insig-
nificant. Again, this higher standard of conception would not be
used to determine inventorship-§ 116 resolves that issue-but to
determine ownership. 1i
VI. CONCLUSION
"Apparently no one foresaw that judges might routinely transfer
pre-1984 ownership concepts into the changed inventorship law."
219
The fact that Congress did not change §§ 261 and 262 underscores
this. In amending § 116, Congress greatly eased the burden on joint
inventors, attorneys, and the Patent and Trademark Office of grant-
ing patents in situations where it was previously impossible to do so.
Surely, Congress did not intend to create one inequity by relieving
another. In the future, Congress should once again amend the Patent
Act to clarify the rights of joint inventors and joint owners and to re-
flect the true nature of contributions from joint inventors. In the in-
terim, courts should consider the three recommendations noted
above. Of these, only fractionating the patent achieves true equity
216. Childress, 945 F.2d at 507.
217. See supra note 204.
218. See supra Part II.A.1 for a discussion of conception.
219. Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1471
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., dissenting).
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between co-inventors with respect to their ownership rights. As
noted, none of the recommendations changes the law of joint inven-
torship. Rather, they change the application of joint ownership con-
cepts. Likewise, granting ownership rights to joint inventors, who
have agreed ahead of time that their contributions merge into a
whole, would not alter the distribution of equity. However, at the
present there remains an anomaly which equates joint inventors with
joint owners, a result unsupported by the law.
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